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Aviation, Herben Hoover and His "American Plan" 
as the American Grocer's Association praised his work. 
Afier the war, Wilson appointed him head ofthe American 
Relief Association tasked to distribute food to 370 million 
Europeans. Hoover accomplished this task as he had the 
others, with great success. The nation was taking note and 
his popularity was rising. Both parties were calling for him 
to run for the presidency in 1920, but Hoover, a 
Republican, was never active in politics (fig. 1). "I hadbeen 
so nonpartisan during the war, both in word and in deed, 
that I had no standing in either political party,'" Hoover 
wrote. 
Hoover had intended to settle down in California where 
he '%oped to renew association with a great lady and two 
highly satisfactory boys."' His plans were to turn out 
differently. 
The Republican victory of 1920 sent Warren Harding to 
i 
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the White House. Harding offered Hoover his choice of 
being either Secretary of Interior or Commerce. Hoover i 
requested he be nominated for the then-less-significant 
Department ofcommerce. Hoover understood the potential j 
Commerce possessed for fulfilling an important role in i 
what he termed the "reconstruction and development" of i ! 
the nation, despite the Department's "inbred bureaucracy." 
His purpose became one of establishing the efficacy of what 
: 
had become the administrative home for nine fragmented 
bureaus lacking common goals and direction. Former 
Secretary ofcommerce Oscar Straus told him that the work 
of the Department required but two hours a day. "Putting . 
the fish to bed at night and turning on the lights aroundthe r. 
coast were possibly the major concepts of the office," he 
was told.6 
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Economic conditions following World War I had created 
unemployment, housing shortages, and wasted production 
capacity. Hoover believed govemment had the ability, in 
cooperation with its citizenry, to expedite and promote 
economic recovery; he also believed Commerce was the 
proper administrative department for such a task? 
Hoover accepted the post only on the condition that he 
would be given a "voice on all important economic policies 
o f  the  administration,'" even those involving other 
departments withim the cabinet. Hoover critic Walter 
Liggett"' noted during the 6rst year of his secretariat that 
"Hoover is Secretary of Commerce and assistant secretary 
o f  everything else."" SeQ&uy Hoover began his newjob, 
as National Bureau of Standards (NBS) historian Rexmond 
Cochrane described him, "determined to recover the 
Nation, singlehandedly [sic] ifnecessary, from its wartime 
splurge, its consequent depletion of resources, and the 
general economic demoralization into which it had 
p l~nged." '~  
The Role of Government in Business 
The new Secretary moved quickly, implementing reforms 
based on his concept of an "American System:' or what 
Ellis Hawley termed Hoover's philosophy of an 
"Associative State."" His "American System" favored a 
small government that worked with groups of associations, 
o r  "associationalism," to bring about emomic efficiency 
through cooperation and national planning. Hoover's 
political t h i i i n g  during his term of office would redefine 
the relationship between government, American business 
and  foreign trade. At its core lay "American 
Individualism," a Hooverian philosophical viewpoint that 
perceived the United States to be unique among nations. 
It springs i?om something infinitely more 
enduring; it springs tom the one source 
of human progress--that each individual 
shallbegiven the chance and stimulation 
for development of the best with which 
he has been endowed in heart and mind; 
it is the sole source of progress; it is 
American individualism." 
Hoover believed that the United States had begun a 
transition toward a monopolistic and autocratic economic 
state during the late nineteenth century. U~estrained 
individualism, coupled with Adam Smith's theory of 
capitalism, and the laissez faire policies of the Federal 
government had created this climate. Autocracy, to Hoover, 
implied that only a few in society were endowed with the 
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wisdom and ability todecide the economic fate ofthemany, 
thereby creating social classes such as those found in 
Europe. Hoover disdained the notion that labor and 
management should be considered social classes and that 
labor was no more than a "commodity." Instead heviewed 
both labor and management as "producers," believing that 
both management and labor should work together for the 
benefit of all. His work included a crusade to ban child 
labor and the twelve-hour workday as well as to ensure 
labor was guaranteed the right to collective bargaining. 
American Individualism embodied cooperation, self- 
regulation, a mutual purpose of responsibility and "service 
to our  fellow^."'^ 
Correcting the movement toward autocracy required 
governmental r d a i n t  of industry in the form of law and 
regulation. Hoover sought balance. The individual must be 
given oppormnity to rise to his potential, but business must 
be regulated to insure fair competition and obviate market 
domination16. "Regulation toprevent domination andunfair 
~ractices, yet preserving rightful initiative, are in keeping 
with our social foundations."" 
An essential component of the associative state required 
a synthesis of "institutional" self-regulation, national 
oversight and planning. Hoover believed in the importance 
of individual creativity and private initiative, and it was 
this individualism that stimulated new industries. 
Historically, as industries founded in individualism began 
to  mature, they affected the national economy in a 
'%aphazard" way. Haphazard development created waste 
and disrupted the economy. Waste contributed to the 
'booms and slumps" inherent in the business cycle a n 4  
with it, unemployment and bankruptcies. At the point 
where such industries interfered with tiee competition on 
a national scale, regulation was required. Government, 
through oversight, conferences and industrial self- 
regulation, would maintain a climate of competition, effect 
an increase in efficiency, reduce wasteand conserve limited 
resources. It would also mitigate the effects ofthe business 
cycle. Hoover preached the proper place for this 
coordiiation rested withii theFederal Government, but not 
a government whose sole purpose was purely regulatory. 
Instead, it would also be one of word'iation and 
cooperation-peration between trade associations, 
industries and labor. In other words, it should be a 
govemmentthat recognizesthesuperiority ofindividualism 
while cooperating with and regulating business and 
indushy. The results of this synergistic relationship would 
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produce an ever-higher standard of living for its citi~ens'~. 
"There, however, arises a time when this haphazard 
development must be coordinated in order secure its best 
results to  the nation as a whole,"19 he told an audience of 
miniig engineers in 1920. 
Nationalizing industry was not his goal, nor did he 
believe that direct control or operation of business should 
be placed in the hands of bureaucrats. Even though the 
railroads had been nationalized during the war, he 
advocated oversight be speedily returned to the owners. 
Under his swetariat he was able to report to the President 
in 1926 that the railroads had increased in eEciency, 
profits and rolling stock. Later he wrote that the benefit 
enjoyed by the nation, which resulted &om this 
"elimination of waste," was attributable, in part, to his 
policy of co~peration.~~ 
The Purpose of Bureaucracy 
Hoover visualized a responsive bureaucracy, working 
with and not against business. Its role was to be one of 
orchestrating teamwork and becoming the focal point for 
planning and problem solving. Government should work 
with industry, trade associations and labor to establish 
national policy and promote cooperation and volunteerism 
among competitors and even between labor and 
management. To accomplish these goals during his tenn of 
office, Hoover expanded the regulatory role of the 
Department ofCommercealong with its sphereofinfluence 
and bureaucra#'. The new Hooverian bureaucracy, as 
Hawley points out, was to be unique. 
Its whole purpose differed. By building 
industrial self-government and thus 
reducing the need for governmental 
controls, it was actually checking the 
whole movement toward big 
government; and by fostering and 
nourishing the grassroots activities of 
private groups and local communities, it 
w a s  p romot ing  democra t i c  
decentralization rather than bureaucratic 
centralismP. 
The number of Hoover's converts to associationalism 
grew, and aAer assuming the secretariat, he practiced what 
h e  preached. Within days of taking office, he formed an 
advisory committee consisting of leaders fkom agriculture, 
business and labor. From this initial meeting came the 
blueprints for fUrther Commerce policy and direction, 
During his secretariat he called over 3,000 such 
fostering trade, increasing mnomic expansion and taking [ 
the lead in research and standardization. Wilson desaibed d 
conferences. The purpose, accord'ig to historian Joan Hoff 
Wilson, was more than problem-solving, it was also "a i 
publicity tool, designed to dramatize cooperative 1 individualism and associationalism.'" Hoover, the u 
% 
consummate engineer, with the aid of his advisory t 
committees, analyzed the causes of problems and sought 
him as a "domestic dynamo," actively involved, as he 
wanted to be, in the economic decisions of the White 
House. The popular perception of Hoover, his work ethic 
and political influence is hest illustrated by Ding's (Jay 
Darling's) political cartoon published in 1927 (fig. 2)=. 
Reorganization and Redirection 
Reorganiziig the Department of Commerce began almost 
immediately. Without a well-organized bureaucracy to 
implement his plans, economic solutions would be slow in 
coming. The bureaus that called Commerce their home in 
1921 included the Bureaus of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce, Census, Fisheries, Steamboat Inspenion 
Service, Navigation, Coast and Geodetic Survey, 
Lighthouses and, one that played a central role in the 
development of aeronautical telecommunications, the 
Bureau of Standards. Hoover divided management of the 
bureaus between the Department's Solicitor, Stephen 
Davis, and the Assistant Secretary, Claudius Huston, but 
retained direct oversight of the Bureau of Foreign and 
Domestic Commerce and the Bureau of Standards. His 
second report to the President boasted savings of over 
$3,000,000 due to his reorganization efforts in the 
Deparhnent ofCommerce. Hoover praised the efforts ofhis 
bureau heads for their increasedefficiency and "progressive 
methods," reporting the "great progress in fact and in zeal 
during the year." " 
solutions." 
Hoover accomplished his stated objective oftransforming 
the Department of Commerce kom an ineffective, 
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disjointed mix of bureaus into a consequential force for 
economic growth and technological leadership in the 
United States. Associationalism and American 
Individualism guided his policy decisions, and total 
immersion in the work of Commerce secured their 
implementation. Even Hoover critic Liggett was forced to 
admit that the Secretary was not only creative, but also 
remarkably capable in elevating the Department's stature, 1 
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Hoover's grander vision included an expanded role for members h e a t e d  his efforts by refusing to relinquish 
Commerce within the executive branch. His reorganization their jurisdictional authority and cooperate with his plan. 
designs included the transfer of bureaus and agencies itom He did, however, manage 
other administrativedepartments to his own. Some cabinet 
The t d i c  preb1.m in Washington, 0. C. 
I Figure 2-Ding's View of the Hoover secretaria?' 
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to have transferred a few bureaus fiom the Interior and 
Agriculture Departments to Commerce. Through his effort 
and influence in Congress, the Department in 1926 gained 
an important bureaucratic organization whosepurpose was 
to regulate an industry that would come to have a profound 
effect on the nation's economy: the Aeronautics Bran~h.~' 
When Hoover assumed the Secretariat, he discovered five 
ofthe bureaus weremanaged by political appointees whose 
background had nothing to do with the technical work 
being accomplished in their departments. He immediately 
sought their removal, replacing them with technical men 
@om withiin the ranks. His reform included bui1ding"esprit 
de corps" among the disparate divisions by improving 
working conditions, increasing salaries and, most 
importantly, establishing open l i e s  of communication 
between the Department and among the bureaus through 
weekly staffmeetings where questions could be raised and 
answered "off the record." He added professional experts 
and capable young men willing to serve in government to 
the roster of Commerc9. His intent was to l lf i l  the 
Department's mandate to "foster, promote, and develop the 
foreign and domestic commerce, the mining, 
manuhcturing, shipping and fishery industries, the labor 
interests and the transportation facilities of the United 
 state^."'^ He was well on his way. 
Standardization 
If associationalism was the standard under which Hoover 
planned to wage the war for economic recovery, 
standardization was the weapon and the elimination of 
waste was the objective. Eliminating industrial waste took 
on a broader meaning when applied to Hoover's plans. It 
did not necessarily represent "individual" or 'W1111" 
waste; rather, the term referred to industry-wide waste due 
to lack of coordination, cooperation and unchecked 
competition. Waste could be mitigated or eliminated by 
scientific research, analysis and cooperative effort. The 
vehicle for this vital mission fell to the NBS. It was the 
logical choice because of its early work in manufkcturing 
standardization and its association with the American 
Engineering Standards Committee which represented 
technical societies, trade, professional and business 
organizations. The added political attention and direct 
access to  the Secretary made the NBS the beneficiary of 
additional resources and an expanded role within the 
Department. The functions of the NBS would quickly 
include increased responsibility for the development of 
aeronautical telecommunications. 
Swn, the label "standardization" was synonymous with 
''elimination of waste," and Hoover's campaign employed 
a 'Three-pronged attack on waste in commerce and 
industry." The Bureau developed specifications, which 
brought increased manufacturing quality, simplified 
products, and standardized materials, machinery and 
business practices." 
The Leverage of Research 
Research was not to be neglected. Hoover observed a 
relationship between pure and applied science and public 
policy. Pure scientific research, as he saw it, was the "raw 
material ofapplied science." Basic research was important, 
and he was committed to its fundig. As chairman of the 
National Academy of Sciences, Hoover sought between 
$10,000,000 and $20,000,000 in 1926 for the purpose of 
funding American research universities over a ten-year 
period. The NBS was to conduct "industrial" research that 
included investigations intoradio interference, propagation 
of radio waves and radio direction finding for navigation. 
During bis administration, the Bureau made significant 
progress in scientific research that positively impacted 
industry? 
The Results 
Leaders of industry and labor applauded the new 
Department of Commerce that emerged during Hoover's 
sexetariat. The Chief of the Statistical Research Division, 
E. Dana Durand, reported great strides in national 
efficiency in theDeparhnentYs 1927 report tothe President. 
Indwxywas becoming moreefficient and prosperous. "The 
progress in efficiency is brought into sharp relief by 
comparing the increase in the product of agriculture, 
mining, manufactures, and railways with increase in the 
number ofpersonsemployed in these branche~,"~hewrote. 
- ~ 
Conaete prwf of Hoover's war on industrial waste could 
be seen in productivity levels in each of the branches the 
Department tracked. Commerce measured an 80 percent 
gain in industrial productivity between 1898 and 1926. Of 
these gains, 29 percent, according to Durand's statistical 
analysis, were experienoedbetween 1924 and 1926 (fig 33). 
The cause for the United States' new found productivity lay 
in natural resources and the attitude, intelligence and work 
ethic of the "producing population." 
These basic causes of economic progress 
translate themselves into a number of 
more specific and directly workiig 
cam. Among these may be mentioned 
especially the advance in education, 
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scientific research, and invention; the 
growing use of mechanical power, 
machinery, and other forms of capitol; 
the larger scale of production; the 
conscious and concerted effort to 
eliminate waste and reduce costs [and] 
the high scale of wages.)l 
The  Department's reports were not the only publications 
touting Hoover's accomplishments. In the April 1926 issue 
of Industrial Management, industry leaders join& in the 
chorus of voices singing the praise of his programs. The 
editors began with an expression of gratitude for the 
escalating prosperity enjoyed by "every man, woman and 
child in America." Increased prosperity was due in large 
measure to his program ofwaste elimination, simplification 
and  standardization. Said John Edgerton, President of the 
National Association Manufacturers: 
American industry owes a debt of 
gratitude to the Honorable Herbert 
Hoover for the eminent service he has 
performed in lifting the Depamnent of 
Commerce born a position of innocuous 
desuetude to one of indispensable 
importance of the country's welfare. 
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Magnus Alexander, President of the National Industrial 
Conference Board, also gave praise. "Mr. Hoover's 
effective cooperation with industryin encouraging stability 
and efficiency and in eliminating waste is too well known 
to require further emphasis." Walter Ctuysler, Chrysler 
Corporation said, "He is a national benefactor, and 
American business has reason indeed to be highly indebted 
to him." G. E. Tripp, Chairman, Westinghouse said, "His 
great achievement has been to establish a new and better 
relationship between government and business." C. L. 
Reierson, President, Remington Arms Company said, 'The 
Department of Simplified Practice, operating under theable 
direction of Secretary H o w ,  has made long strides in 
eliminating wasteful duplication manuicture." And so the 
praise continued. The article contained the testimony of 59 
leaders in American industsy; all praising Hoover for his 
programs, insight, ability and accomplishments as 
Secretary of Cornmere?'. Henry Ford endorsedHoover for 
president in 1928 because "Mr. Hoover is expected to be a 
great and forward-leading President because he  is a 
national engineer who understands the machinery of the 
national li~eliood."'~ 
Hwverian Culture 
Hoover's vision for the merit of Commerce was the 
efficient, fair administration of the economic and social 
well-being ofthe nation. His Department was to become an 
example of associationalism-not individualism, nor 
collectivism and neither socialism nor monopolistic 
capitalism. Instead it was to serve ultimately as the arbiter, 
"for harmoniously functioning, selEregulating economic 
units."39 "Progress," he said during his presidential 
inaugural address "is born of woperation in the 
community-not 6om governmental restraints. The 
Government should assist and encourage these movements 
of collective self-help by itself moperating with them.'- 
Aviation's Legislative Mandate-The Air Commerce Act 
of 1926 
The Promise of Regulation. 
Commercial aviation existed in the "chaos of laissez 
%wee*' when Hoover was sworn in as Secretary of 
Commerce. William MacCrackeP, who would become the 
first Assistant Secretary for Aeronautics, pointed out that 
for the most part, the public was "still blind to aviation's 
tremendous potential for transforming ow travel customs 
and enriching our industry,'' many believing that aviation 
was "somewhere between a sport and a sideshow.'" 
Colonel Hiram Bingham," wbo as a Senator from 
Connecticut would later play a pivotal role in bringing 
about aviation legislation, argued in 1920 that the high, 
preWorld War I death rate of well-known aviators had 
dampened popular support for commercial aviation. The 
war, he said, had injectednew life into aviation's prospects 
with popular visions of American aircraft ovenvhelming 
German Forces. 
Delays and lackluster industry performance had 
discouraged public support, and, by 1918, the 'inan in the 
street threw his aviation ideals overboard, shrugged his 
shoulders, and decided that somebody had sold him a gold 
bri~k.'"~ But Bingham articulated a concept held by many 
in government and business, that the development of the 
industry was important for commerce and its advancement 
as a commercial entity was vital to the American military 
and national "aerial defense." He called for a Department 
ofAeronautics and called for support in the development of 
aids to navigation, meteorological services and airports. 
"Whose business is it to do all these things?"' The answer, 
Bingham believed, lay in a Depment  ofAeronautics that 
would be tasked with fostering the industry.* 
The E m  of Laissez Faire Capitalism 
Bingham's description of the state of aviation in 1920 
was a fair account. The government had done nothing to 
encouragethe application of aviation in commercenor had 
it established any type of regulatory environment to 
cultivate its development. The aircraft industry, which had 
produced an abundance of military airmall, found itself 
flooded with surplus airplanes such as "lennys" and de 
Havilland DH-4s, as well as discharged military aviators 
lookmg for flying work. Military airmatt, designed and 
built for combat, were ill-suited for conunercial 
applications. Pilots bought the surplus aircraft and began 
looking for ways to earn a living. About the only work 
available for a recently discharged aviator with a surplus 
Army airplane was barnstorming--giving rise to the term 
"gypsy flyer." Gypsy flyers traveled fiom town to town 
performing stunts and offering rides to those willing to risk 
it. It was laissez faire capitalism at its finest with 
competition so vigorous that most pilots found it hard to 
keep body and soul together. The gypsy flyer thrilled 
audiences with daredevil stunts but did little to advance the 
cause of commercial aviation. In 1922, as President 
Harding was dedicating the Lincoln Memorial, an aviator 
''buzzed" the aowd attending the ceremony. The dangerous 
stunt, while raising the ire of the spectators and officials, 
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was not illegal. 'Dangerous to the extreme:' noted The 
Literary Digest, this incident illustrated the need for 
"national air laws.'*' 
Many Americans began thinkmg of flying as extremely 
hazardous, a sport meant for the wealthy or risk-taker, 
having no real commercial application. Not all saw it that 
way, however. There were those who believed government 
regulation would bring about safety and an orderly 
environment for the development of aviation. These 
missionaries of wmmercial aviation began preaching a 
gospel ofregulation. Without safetyregulation, the causeof 
wmmercial aviation wuld not a d ~ a n c e . ~  
Early Attempts 
Aerial advertising, photography and crop dusting were a 
fav of the early attempts at commercializing aviation. The 
Department o f  Agriculture &st experimented with crop 
dusting in 1919, but the fatality of its only pilot in August 
forced the Department to discontinue its experiment. 
Shortly after, the  State of Ohio successfully experimented 
with the concept of aerial spraying and inspired the 
Agriculture Department to once again take up flying. Some 
pilots found work by transporting cargo, but by far themost 
lucrative use o f  aviation, during prohibition, was the 
transportation o f  bootleg liquor tom Canada and Mexico. 
Laissez faire meant governmental non-interference, The 
government did not provide regulations for the proper 
maintenance o f  aircrak licensing ofpilots, or manufacture 
of  aircrafi, nor did it fimd the development of an 
infiastruchue to support the safe and orderly movement of 
aircraft. The policy of non-interference impeded the 
development of  the industry, and for many years, it would 
remain uncoordinated and unsafe, its prospect as a viable 
transportation mode que~tionable~~. 
The public and political aviation regulation debate 
spanned the years between 1918 and 1925 and gave rise to 
more than 25 investigations. While there had been an 
"excessive" number of inquiries, "something can yet be 
accomplished by further investigation" William P. 
MacCracken remarked during an address to the Law Club 
in December 1925. He reported that there were five major 
aeronautical investigations in progresss0. Of the five he 
described, one would prove to be propitious, the President's 
Aircraft Board. 
Interestingly, the conclusions ofmany ofthe inquiries did 
not question whether aviation should be regulated, rather, 
how it should be regulated. Even the industry itself, 
manufacturers and operators alike, understood the 
Aviation, Herbert Hoover and His "American Plan" 
advantages of Federal oversight. In this the industry was 
unique. Responding to a letter from Representative Fredrick 
C. Hicks (R-NY), Hoover replied, "It is interesting to note 
that this is the only industry that favors having itself 
regulated by the Government." In the past, other 
industries and interest groups had sought regulation of one 
another. Such had been the case when the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) was formed in 1887. The 
creation oftheICC, according to political scientist Deborah 
Stone, was the result of interest group pressure whose goal 
was to ensure that the "interests of railroads, 
manufkcturers, and h e r s "  were "balanced."s1 
How commercial aviation was to be regulated was a 
source of debate that not only slowed legislative action, but 
also ultimately defined it. Commercial aviation was to be 
advanced for two important reasons--commercial 
transportation and national security. The wedding of 
commercial and military aviation was never questioned. 
The argument was simple. In order to provide an adequate 
military industrial base with trained pilots and mechanics, 
the wmmercial aviation industry must be strong. National 
defense would benefit by a flourishing commercial aviation 
industty because of the inaeased manufacturing capacity, 
trained pilots and aircraft reserves. '"The saving in direct 
govwnmental expenditures would be enom~ous,"~~ said 
Hoover in a New York Times interview. Acting Secretary of 
War, Dwight Davis, said in testimony before the 
President's Aircraft Board, that "it is recognized that the 
transportation facilities of a nation are a vital dement in its 
defense organization."" 
The major issues surrounding the political controversy 
did not question the military-civilian connection, rather 
they had to do with where a newly aeated bureaucratic 
structure should reside within an administrativebranch and 
what segments of aviation it should regulate. Should the 
United States model its administration of aviation after 
European countries and place all aviation, including the 
military, under a single regulatov agency? Or should 
responsibility for the Army and Navy air-arms continue to 
reside within their respective services, administratively 
separated fiom civilian control? Should all military 
aviation, both Army and Navy be placed under a single 
military command? To what extent, if at all, should the 
indushy be subsidized, and what form should this subsidy 
take? Does the Constitution allow Congress to extend 
aviation safety regulation to commercial operations 
engaged only in intrastate commerce?% 
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The Secretary's Role 
Hoover's involvement in the aviation issue as Secretary 
of Commerce began shortly affer he assumed the 
secretariat. The Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce" had 
taken note of the President's call for aviation legislation 
during his inaugural address in 1921. The Chamber of 
Commerce wmmented: "Commercial aviation, struggling 
for nearly three years without the assistance of a national 
policy, found an intelligent and sympathetic fiiend in the 
Harding administration."" Action, in the form of a bill, 
followed quickly. It proposed to place regulatory 
responsibility for aviation in the Department ofcommerce, 
and those in the industry and in the administration began 
looking to Hoover for guidance. 
On March 23, just 17 days a h  he assumed the 
secretariat, Hoover received a letter fiorn Dr. Charles 
Walcott, Chairman ofthe National Advisov Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA)" outlining the NACA's position for 
the advancement of wnunercial aviation and a synopsis of 
two aviation bills before Congress. Under the NACA 
proposal, the Departments of War and Navy would retain 
control of their individual air-arms. The NACA would 
continue its mission as focal point for "aeronautical 
activities" and "direct continuous prosecution of scientific 
research in aeronautics" while a Bureau of Aeronautics 
would be created within the Department ofCommerce. The 
NACA considered commercial aviation tobe'the backbone 
of military prepa~edness.''~~ 
On April 1, a special committee of the NACA drafted a 
letter for the President's signature. The President signed 
the letter that directed Walwtt to form a subcommittee of 
the NACA to "take up vigorously and l l l y  the question of 
Federal regulation of air navigation, [and] air routes to 
cover the d o l e  United States." The subcommittee was to 
be wmprised of representatives fiorn the Departments of 
War,Navy, Commerce, Post Office and "civil life."Hoover 
assigned Dr. Samuel Stratton, head of the Bureau of 
Standards, tothe committee. TheDepartment ofcommerce 
was now "officially" involved in defining an American 
system of regulation, and it was able to make known its 
position and influence policy outcomes59. 
Early in his secretariat, Hoover developed seven policy 
objectives that formed the core of his proposed aviation 
legislation. The first was a national airway system 
supported by the Federal government. Second, Hoover 
understood it was necessary to subsidize the new 
transportation system by using it to canythe mail. His third 
objective was to create a strong commercial industry 
thereby providing an " a d i  to defense." Fourth, an 
increase in safety would result 6om the licensing and 
regulation of aircraft and pilots. He believed the 
government had no busiias in the '%usinas" of flight; 
therefore, he called for shifting responsibility for airmail 
service 6om Post Office aircraft and pilots to private 
companies. He also understood the importance ofcontinued 
aeronautical research and development and the "creation of 
a governmental agency to conduct these services." While 
Hoover did not believe government should be directly 
involved in commercial aviation, he did believe that 
government had a role to play in its development--that of 
fostering its growth through indirect subsidy. 
The business community wasted no time. In June 1921, 
Hoover received a letter %om AviationandAircraft J o m l  
publisher L.D. Gardner, whosendas spokesman for some 
influential aeronautical organizations. Gardner had been 
asked to arrange a meeting with Hoover. The Secretary 
explained that those interested in the subject should take it 
up with the appropriate Congressional committee. If the 
association believed it important, he would "appoint a 
committee and give the matter further consideration.'" 
Gardner replied that if Hoover would call a meeting, the 
Secretary would have an opportunity to hear the opinions 
of the various associations. Gardner believed that some 
form of agreement might be reached as to themost effective 
way to present recommendations for aviation policy to the 
Congressional Committee on Foreign and Interstate 
Commerce. "As these matters are now before Congress, 
everyone hopes that you will take some definite action as 
early as possible,'62 Gardner wrote. 
Hoover's reply to Maurice Cleuy, Directing Governor of 
the Aero Club of America, agreed to a prefatory meeting 
with the aviation interest groups, he wrote, "there is no 
reason why those interested in civil aviation should not 
form an association for promotion of their views." 
Although Hoover was not yet sure that oversight of civil 
aviation would be ultimately placed in the Commerce 
Department, he said he would "welcome a committee 6om 
such an association.'" Luther Bell, Director of 
Information of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association," 
and Clarence Stetson, Hoover's secretary, manged the 
meeting on July 18 between Hoover and an association 
comprised of the Aero Club of America, the National 
Aircraft U n d e ~ i t e r s  Association, the Manufacturers 
Aircraft Association and the Society of Automotive 
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Engineersbs. Hoover'spolitical doctrineofassociationalism 
was King worked out in aviation. 
While on a trip to observe a military bombing 
demonstration, a Hoover aide spoke with Howard Cofh,  
vice-president o f  Hudson Motor Car Company, Samuel S. 
Bradley, manager of Manufacturers Airaaft Association, 
and C. M. Keys, president of W s s  Aeroplane and Motor 
Corp. The aide r e e d  tothe Secretary that the purpose of 
the meeting would be to secure "leadership in mapping out 
a program of development" for commercial aviation 
legislation. Additionally, the representatives wanted to see 
a separate civil aviation branch established in the 
Department of Commerce." 
During the meeting with the industry representatives 
Hoover was concerned about the issue of safety and 
protection of "public life and property." The Secretary 
requested an industry survey be made of the hazards 
associated with unregulated flight. Second, he supported 
the industry representatives dratimg aviation legislation 
and submitting it for congressional action. The report 
Hoover had requested listed the cause ofaccidents between 
October 1,1920, and October 1,1921, and pointed to the 
need for Federal oversight. Additionally it listed "Six 
Requisites for Safe Flying," two of which were '"Nation- 
wide weather &recasts'' and "Nation-wide chart of air 
routes."67 The organization drafted a bill modeled after 
NACA recommendations, adding a proposal that would 
have given the Department of Commerce jurisdiction over 
both inter and intrastate commerce. 
"Report to Hoover Declares Federal Supervision Would 
D o  Away With Most Mishaps," headlined the New York 
Times while the New York J-1 of Commerce headlined 
"Airplane Traffic Control Imperativ4ov't Regulation 
Needed, Says Report to Hoover," and from the Philadelghia 
Evening Ledger: "Hoover Considers Aviation Control.'" 
These newspapers as well as othersrepted the work ofthe 
committee and Hoover's support for legislation. The bill 
was drafted by the association and introduced in December 
by Senator James Wadsworth (R-NY), chairman of the 
Committee on Military A&is, and Representative Fred 
H i c k  (R-NY). Unfortunately, state's rights advocates 
recoiled at the notion of Federal rule over intrastate 
commerce, and the bill was effectively dead on arrival.69 
The debate over intrastate and interstate Federal 
jurisdiction and political maneuvering had prevented 
passage of aviation legislation in 1921. Meanwhile in 
February 1922, the American Bar Association's (ABA) 
Committee on Air Law, chaired by MacCracken, was 
meeting with another aviation committee and JudgeLamb, 
theDepartment's solicitor. Thegroup directedMacCracken 
to meet with the chairman of the House Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee, Representative Samuel 
Winslow (R-NY)". His purpose was one of lobbying for 
aviation legislation. Although Winslow was initially cold 
to  the idea, MacCracken was able warm h i  up and secure 
his help. Winslow pressed Assistant Legislative Counsel 
Fred Lee into service, telling hi: 
Now you two fellows get together. I think 
Mr. MacCracken knows somethiig about 
aviation, and I know you know 
something about drafting legislation. 
Whatever you agree upon, I'll introduce 
and get through Congress?' 
Lee and MacCracken drafted the Winslow Bill and sent 
it to Hoover for comment. He delegated it to Judge Lamb 
who revised it based on the Department's political 
approach. In August, Judge Lamb received a lelter kom the 
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce's Sam Bradley. "I'm 
getting anxious for some real information relative to the 
status of aerial legislation," he wrote. The answer came 
fiom Hoover who hoped Congress would debate the 
Winslow bill when it reconvened. Bradley wrote back, 
emphasizing the need for quick action. He compared the 
plight of aviation with the air mail service operated under 
Post Office regulation. Detailing 18 aviation accidents that 
had occurred between May 30 and August 21, he compared 
that accident rate to 12 months of airmail operations 
without a single fatality. The airmail enjoyed "continuous 
operation under proper Federal inspection and control," he 
pointed out. Bradley strongly urged Hoover to impress the 
urgency of the situation upon the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Continued delay would 
slow development of commercial aviation and cause 'The 
needless loss of lives.'" Hoover sent a letter to Winslow 
suggestingtheConpsman "expedite"workon legislation 
saying 'St would appear to me, that the matter is of a 
pressing order." The Congressman replied: "It seemsto me 
quite unlikely that any legislation will be considered by 
either committee or Congress before the December 
se~sion."~ 
The Secretary received correspondence not only ffom 
those in the aircraft industry such as A. B. Johnston, 
president of the Huff Daland Aero Corporation in New 
York, but also from those within government. The 
S e c r e t q  oftheNavy Edwin Denby, his Assistant Secretary 
Theodore Rwsevelt, and Secretary of War John Weeks, 
expressed support for establishing an aeronautics branch 
IAAER, Spring ZOO l Page 45 
11
Johnson: Aviation, Herbert Hoover and His “American Plan”
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2001
Aviation, Herbet? Hoover and His "American Plan" 
withii Commerce and offered assistance in pushing the 
Wislow bill through committee." 
Unforhmately, the Winslow Bill was not introduced until 
the closing days of the Si -seventh  Congress and got 
nowhere. Winslow would wait until the Sixty-eighth 
Congress was seated in December 1923 to reintroduce his 
legislation. The bill finally reached committee where its 
members were less than enthusiastic about Federal control 
over intrastate commerce. The Winslow bill was reported 
out of committee on January 15, 1925, with only weeks 
remaining in the Sii-eighth Congress. The bill died. 
Wislow retired f?om Congress.15 
Throughout 1922 and 1923, Hoover had called aviation 
conferences and supported legislative action. In his 1922 
report to the President, he said: "the conference urgently 
recommended regulation" because ofthe high accident rate 
due to inexperienced aviators and "hulty machines." 76 
The Commerce Department, between November 1922 and 
June 1923, had sponsored five such conferences. These 
included drafting navigation and airdrome safety rules and 
the formulation ofsafety codes for aircraft power plants and 
a i r h e s n .  Hoover continued his call for action in 1923, 
writing that commercial aviation in the United States was 
hlalling behind other nations and that "this method of 
transportation means much to our economic and social 
progress and every encouragement, legislative and 
otherwise, should be given to its de~elopment."~ 
The period between 1923 and 1925 saw little new 
legislative interest. Hoover claimed that "we carried the 
matter to the country as best we could; but the subject, being 
highly technical, had little emotional appeal." In an 
interview with the Boston American in October 1924, he 
again linked safety to the general acceptance of aviation. 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce, J. Walter Drake, touted 
the Department's policy position during a radio address 
broadcast on November 10, 1925, *om station WRC in 
Washiion,  D.C. Drake explained the importance of 
transportation in the daily lives of all Americans and noted 
that aviation was a significant element in commerce and 
defense. While commercial aviation should not be 
subsidized directly it should receive assistance in the form 
of navigation facilities. "We must provide for lighting 
airways, for signal stations, for radio facilities, and for 
adequate weather services," he said. The American Review 
of Reviews articulated the issues surrounding the debate in 
October 1925, editorializing that the Department of 
Commerce could better promote aviation by providing air 
routes, radio stations and the "directional useof radio in air 
navigati~n."~ 
Although advocates for wmmercial aviation were vocal, 
the "problem" of aeronautical regulation had not yet 
reached a point by 1925 that it had attracted enough 
political attention to require congressional action. Hoover i 
explained the lack of interest was due to the fact that I 
"Congress is always overburdened with legislativedemands, 
li 
and only those having large public support can get 
attention." Komons would agree. Aviation as an industry 
had been declining, and the subject of civil aviation had 
become, as political scientist John Kingdon would describe 
it, a "condition" and not a problemm. 
I 
There was an abundance of indicators such as the hi& 1 
accident rate among barnstormers and the general decliie ! 
in the state ofthe aviation industry. Doing something about j 
it, however, was a &&rent issue. Kingdon points out: 
"F'roblems are o h  not self-evident bythe indicators. They 
need a little push to get the attention of people in and 
around g~vemment."~' 
The "little push" to get things moving turned out to be 
General Billy Mitchell, a strong and vocal proponent of a 
unified air service for many years, and highly crit~cal ofthe 
General Staff who, he believed, were "deliberately 1 
obstructing aerial development."" His criticism had 1 
become an initant to policy makers in the Army and Navy 
Departments as well as the administration. In September, I 
Putnam released Mitchell's book Wtnged Defense. The 
book pointed out that the United States lacked an aviation 1 
policy. Mitchell was convinced the lack of such a policy 
was the cause of "our inefficient national military 
aeronautics, our underdeveloped civil and commercial 
aeronautics.'" Until the conditions were corrected "the au 
power ofthe United States will continue to flounder in the 
slough of aeronautical despond."84 The New York rimes 
reported the book's impending release commenting that 
Mitchell '%as struck out again at the air policies of the 
G~vernment."~' 
As Mitchell continued his assault on a policy that had 
placed aviation on the political back burner, the House of 
Representatives appointed a committee to review the status 
of aviation. Its chair, Florian Lampert (R-WI), was not 
necessarily "fiiendlf' towardsthe Coolidgeadmiiistration 
and planned to give Mitchell a forum in which he wuld 
express his views. Mitchell favored a "Department ofAir," 
under which all military and civilian aviation would be 
placed-a concept not supported by the President. Early in 
Septemba 1925, the Navy airship Shenandoah, 
commanded by Mitchell's fkiend Zachary Lansdowne 
crashed. Lansdowne and thirteen others were killed. The 
accident occurred only days alter disappearance of three 
Navy aircraft that had attempted to fly 6om San Francisco 
to Hawaii Mitchell wuld take no more. Aviation published 
his comments in full. The editor noted that Mitchell's 
statements would "undoubtedly form the basis" of a 
Congressional investigatiou-they would. Thearticle, "Col. 
Mitchell's StatementsofGovt. Aviation," was prophetically 
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subtitled: 'These Contain the Assertions on Which He 
Expects to be Court Martialed."86 The most serious 
accusation was one that could not be ignored by the Army 
and Navy Departments or,more importantly, thehesident. 
"My opinion is  as follows:' he wrote, '%me accidents are 
the  direct result of the incompetency, criminal negligence 
and almost treasonable administration of the national 
defense by the Navy and War departments." 87 The New 
York Times editorialized that Mitchell had "wme pretty 
near breaking the back of what reputation he had lee." As 
to Mitchell's expectation of being ordered before court 
marital, "he certainly ought to." As &I as the Times was 
concerned, his words were 'hot only subordinate but 
incredibly foolish." " 
The looming political threat of the Lampert Committee 
and Mitchell's public accusations compelled the Resident 
to focus the attention of his adminisfxation on the plight of 
aviation and push for legislation that rdected his aviation 
policy. Hoover recommended the Resident appoint a board 
"to consider not  only the military but also all the 
commercial phases" ofthe aviation question. Coolidge lost 
n o  time and within days appointed his friend Dwight D. 
Morrow as chairman of an administrative board "to make 
a study of the best means of developing and applying 
aircraft in national defense."* Komonspoints out Coolidge 
was "determined to court-martial Billy Mitchell."" 
The Resident's Aircraft Board, or The Morrow Board, 
worked quickly, calling representatives f?om the 
Departments of  War, Navy, Post Office and Commerce. 
Members kom the NACA also testified. 
Speaking for the Secretary of War, Dwight Davis, the 
Assistant Secretary underscored the point that military 
aviation was dependant upon a strong wmmercial aviation 
industry, and that commercial aviation could be developed 
through Federal subsidy by establishing ainvays, navigation 
facilities and meteorological services. Paul Henderson, 
former Second Assistant Postmaster General,who hadbeen 
in charge of developing the Air Mail Service, explained 
that government should continue the important work of 
research and development in "directional radio, and other 
aids t o  navigation." 9' 
Secretary Hoover appeared before the board on 
September 23, reporting toits members that wmmercial air 
transportation was reaching a point of self-sufficiency and 
could exist without subsidy with "certain minor senices" 
provided by the government. The government was already 
providing navigation aids in the form of lighting and 
marking channels for commercial marine navigation. It 
maintained waterways, published charts and provided 
weather and navigation information. 
We have to this, I believe, a complete 
Aviation, Herbert Hoover and His 'American Plan" 
analogy in aviation. Before we can 
expect to develop commercial aviation 
we must determine the air routes tom 
the point of view of the best channels 
through the air in their relation to 
atmospheric conditions. We must 
develop a service for warnings of 
weather disturbance such as we have in 
navigation. We must prepare charts of 
these airways. We must secure the 
provision of landing fields and air ports 
and for marking the route.m 
Regulations and provisions for licensing both pilot and 
aircraft must be developed, as well as inspection ofaircraft. 
"Without such services my belief is that aviation can only 
develop in a primitive way.lm 
Hoover's philosophy of efficiency was brought to bear 
when he proposed that the additional cost of providing and 
maintaining the required infkastructure and regulatory 
environment wuld bemitigated by expanding the duties of 
the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Lighthouse Semce, 
Weather Bweau and the Bweau of Standards. The creation 
of a new aviation bureau would be necessary hut the cost 
would be minimal if the other bureaus worked together to 
provide the required regulatory and support structures. 
Government maintenance of inf?astmcture should not be 
considered a duect subsidy, Hoover argued, it was nomore 
than had been provided for marine transportati~n.~~ 
The Morrow Board adopted Hoover's proposals "in 111" 
and released its report to the President on December 2, with 
its recommendations in keeping with the administration's 
policy as well as Hoover's concept of the administrative 
organization. Ofparticular interest toCoolidge was that the 
Board believed that militaty aviation should be lee under 
the cognizance of each branch's air arm. The President 
sent the Morrow Board recommendations to Congress 
where Senator Hiram Bingham (R-CT) and Representative 
James Parker @-NY), members of the Morrow Board, 
championed legislation in support of the board's 
recommendations. Many in Congressunderstood thenexus 
that existedbetweenthe successofcommercial aviation and 
the government's role in providing an airway and 
communication system. In arguing for the bill, 
Representative Clarence Lea @-CA) pointed to the fact 
that the Federal govenunent had rendered such support in 
the encouragement of other industries. If passed, the bill 
would allocate funds for establishing airways by 
constructing ground-based navigation aids. Congressman 
Jonathan Wainwright (R-NY) added his support for the 
bill's passage, arguing that it had not gone far enough in 
aiding commercial aviation. Theunited States wouldnever 
~~ - -  
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enjoy the benefits of aviation until "we courageously face 
the situation and the needs of commercial aviation." He 
added that the statute would lend encouragement by 
providing navigation facilities, airways and weather 
information. Not all were happy with the bill however. In 
what was probably one of the more humorous debates in 
Congress, Representative George Huddleston @-AL)9s 
opposed the bill. 
Mr. Hoover, who is already been made 
dictator of the radio, now with the bill 
becomes lord of the air. He is already 
lord of the waters. He is the Pooh-Bah of 
this administration. He is the factotum of 
the executive branch of our 
Government-its man of all work. 
He will be lord of the air if this bill 
should pass. Nothiig, unless it falls 
strictly withim the province of the 
Almighty, can be done in all the region 
lying above a man's head that Mr. 
Hoover will not undertake to regulate 
and deal with. Perhaps even a 
disembodied spirit will not be permitted 
to wing its way upward into a better 
world without petitioning Mr. Hoover 
and getting a pilot's license before he 
starts.% 
Over Huddleston's objection, the final bill emerged from 
the Sixty-ninth Congress, tasked the Secretary of 
Commerce "to foster air commerce:' and provided for an 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics. The act 
settled issues of joint military and civilian control. The 
Department of Commerce would oversee commercial 
aviation and the War andNavy Departments wouldmanage 
their own aeronautical interests. The debate over licensing 
aircraft engaged in inter- or intrastate commerce was 
settled in conference. The final version required only the 
registration of airmail employed in interstate commerce. 
President Cooldige signed the bill on May 20, 1926, and 
the  Air Commerce Act became law. The New York Times 
predicted that the 'listorian of commercial aviation will 
make a red-letter day" of the events and noted that the 
airways werenow under the administration ofthe Secretary 
o f  Commerce. In the article, Hoover was quoted as 
predicting that the U.S. would lead the rest ofthe world in 
aviation service within three years. Those who entered the 
commercial aviation business were pioneers and would be 
"powerfblly assisted by the Government under the Air 
Commerce Act.'m 
Among other things, the new law empowered the 
Page 48 
Secretary of Commerce to "advise with the Bureau of 
Standards and other agencies in the executive branch" to 
conduct research and development in the establishment of 
"improved air navigation facilities." Section 5 authorized 
the Post OfIice to transfer to the Commerce Department all " 
the airways and navigation facilities that had been built 
during its supervision ofthe airmails. The Act also directed 
the Weather Bureau (under the Department ofAgriculhrre) 
to support the newly created Aeronautics Branch with 1 
forecasts, weather reports and weather warnings. Military 
commercial aviation had what it wanted and needed: 
E aviation was to be regulated separately, but for now, the 
Federal oversight, safety regulation, legal recognition, 
weather reports, and an indirect subsidy in the form of 
government research, development and application of new 
communication and navigation technologies. " 
Hoover chose William MacCracken to fill the newly- 
created position of Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Aeronautics. MacCracken began serving in August and 
immediately organized the new bureau as Hoover bad 
envisioned. The Bureau of Lighthouses assumed 
responsibility for airway maintenance and development, 
and a new Ai iays  Mapping Sedion fell to the Coast and e 
Geodetic Survey. Radio research conducted under the I 
Bureau of Standards continued with a radio section moving 
to the Aeronautics Research Division. Under Hoover and 
MacCracken's organizational plan, only twounits had tobe 
aeated '%om scratch:" the Information andAii Regulation 
Divisions? 
The new aeronautical regulations that were to be 
promulgated by the Bureau of Aeronautics had to be 
written. The law vested this authority in Secretary Hoover, 
and MacCracken could easily have written appropriate 
regulations and had Hoover sign them. However, the 
Department of Commerce under Hoover had stressed the 
notion of indushy associationalism and consultations with 1 
those it regulated. This plan was to be followed by E 
MacCracken in drafting new regulations. MacCracken 
sought the help of Ira Grimshaw, an assistant to the j 
Department's Solicitor. By October the first draft of the i i 
regulations was complete. The draft was circulated for j 
I 
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comment among the Post Office, Navy and Army 
Departments, aircraft manufacturers and others engaged in 
commercial aviation. Meetings were held at the Commerce 
Department to get feedback. Insurance companies, "fixed 
: 
base operators, and little fellows all over the country,. . . I 
gave us their ideas and feelings," said MacCracken. He 
desaibed the meetings as "stimulating and helphl," 
engendering a spirit of Ernperation. Comments and 
suggestions were incorporated in the regulations, and the I 
h a 1  product represented the philosophy and concerns of 
both the Deparrment and the industry. As to the thornier i 
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issue of barnstormers, MacCracken realized the new 
Bureau would have to "ride herd" on the gypsy flyers 
because "the time had come for a new k i d  of aviation to 
emerge in this country, perhaps less colorll, but certainly 
more respon~ible.'"~ 
Hoover understood the significance of a strong 
commercial aviation indmhy and the far-reaching 
implications it would have on both commerce and national 
defense. He saw government's role as one of creating a 
regulatory climate that would foster and advance. the 
industry. Hoover also understood that without advanced 
communication and navigation aids, commercial aviation 
could not be wnduaed in a safe and orderly environment, 
and its utility as amode oftransportation would he limited. 
He believed that government should provide these aids and 
conduct research and development to continually improve 
them. His philosophy of associationalism and desire for an 
efficient regulatory structure within government fostered 
aviation's growth and provided the necessary structure to 
keep it strong. It would not be without mistakes and 
growing pains, but it would prove to be an effective model 
o f  regulation. When Hoover left office to run for the 
Presidency in 1928, the Department of Commerce had 
developed25,OOO miles ofairways, and licensedover 6,400 
a i raa f t  flying over 25,000,000 miles annually1"'. Writing 
in 73e Magazine ofBusiness in 1928, Hoover predicted 
that within twelve months commercial aviation activity 
would outpace all of Europe combined. He boasted that its 
development was based 'upon a distinctly American plan, 
d i £ k h g  wkolly 6om those of other countries and this plan 
has, I believe, now been demonstrated to have a sound 
basis."'" 
Conclusion 
Hoover was not the sole participant in this political 
process spanning his secretariat, nor was he the only one 
lobbying aviation regulation. However, his influence was 
consequential and his political philosophies were mirrored 
in their structure and administration. Once he was 
empowered to regulate, his management ability and belief 
in efficiency, associationalism and technology ensured that 
the bureauuatic structure within the newly formed 
Aeronautics Branch and Bureau of Standards would 
engender a culture that promoted this new industry and 
produced a technologically advanced aeronautical 
communication and navigation system that would support 
all-weather flight. MacCracken called these services 
"essential" and, in a press release shortly after he had been 
sworn in as Assistant Secretary, he said: 
Little commercial aviation could be 
organized until the fundamental semces 
[airways] were assured, as no 
commercial concern could undertake to 
provide these aids to navigation at its 
individual expense, not only because of 
the large preliminary out lay but because 
such facilities would he equally available 
to  competitor^'^. 
Now that bureaucratic structure and support was in place, 
advances in navigation and communication technologies 
would progress at a W e r  pace and in a more coordinated 
fashion. The work wried out durimg Hoover's tenure as 
Secretary would soon produce an indusby supported by an 
airways system that enabled the growth of commercial 
aviation in the United States and surpassed all of Europe 
combined. 
"Wetransformedthe [aviation] industry from purely mail 
carriers into an actual transportation Herbert 
Hoover wrote in 1934 to his former Postmaster General, 
Walter Brown. At the time, Brown was being investigated 
by the Roosevelt administration for his part in what 
Democratic Senator Hugo Black (D-AL) and others 
believed was the criminal mismanagement of the airmail 
contraas under the Air Mail Act of 1930. Hoover wanted 
the record set straight. His own administration, Hoover 
believed, had corrected fundamental problems in 
commercial aviation and had done it "in such a fashion as 
to make it a great ind~stry."'"~ 
This new industry, commercial aviation, wasborn during 
his secretariat. It resided in his agency and was imprinted 
with his political philosophy. His influence on the industry 
would be felt for years to come. Even though the aviation 
industry would eventually be regulated by other agencies, 
its political policies and procedures would bear the likeness 
of Hoover's American P1an.U 
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